

THIS COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE.

CIA files on these persons were requested and reviewed by HSCA
staff members.

their contact with the defector to the Agency. (buttery 2028) One file reg. a former military person who [contains a defector] report of a debriefing conducted by mil. intel. (b) one of the remaining 4 indirs. was

14-6
[REDACTED]
in complete no file
file

Rec. mil. in info. of the remaining 4 indirs. who [had a direct] contact upon their ret. to the U.S., the
in several areas

Webster:

The circumstances of the Agency's contact w/ the 4 remaining indirs. were diff. in each case. One of the defectors was [unwittingly] interviewed [by a CIA officer in the U.S.]. (b) another attorney, H.C., [REDACTED] upon his departure from the S.U. en route to the U.S. While L's file indicates that the Agency considered a full & controlled debriefing by the CIA, FBI did conduct a hangleton wrote to the FBI suggesting a joint debriefing, there is no evidence in L's 201 file nor any DCD doc. which suggest further contact on the part of the CIA.

One of the individuals [who had a direct] contact upon his return to the U.S. in 1962, (b) he was [debriefed by a CIA officer] after applying for employment in response to a news paper advertisement. (Rev. of donor file.)

More extensive debriefings were conducted of the other two defcs. Pmt. E. Webster, the legally expert with the Read Rev. (b) whose defection to the S.U. in 1959 was [widely publicized], was in [REDACTED] the Read Rev. (b) in 1959 was [widely publicized], was in [REDACTED] a plastics expert with the Read Rev. (b) whose defection to the S.U. in 1959 was slightly publicized. Shortly thereafter, components of Webster in his home territory. Webster had been employed in the S.U. at the Kirovograd Strategic Inst. of Polyethylene Plastics.

4
BR

180-10144-10068

Donald Deasely
worked

(This fact was corroborated by another CIA employee, who worked in the FBI in the Sov. Bureau of the Directorate of Intelligence in 1962 told the HSCA that he specifically recalled collecting intelligence info. regarding the Minsk Radio Plant. In fact, Deasely claims that, during the summer of 1962, he reviewed a contact report from interview ^{interviewing} rep. of the CIA's N.Y. field office, who interviewed a former Marine who had last worked at the Minsk Radio Plant following his defection to the USSR. This person who Deasely believes may have been Lee Oswald had been living w/ his family in Minsk. Deasely advised the Committee that the contact report was filed in a volume concerning the Minsk Radio Plant which should be retrievable from the Selective Registry Branch which, in 1962, was a component of the DDC.

The HSCA requested ^{made a request to} the CIA. The HSCA requested that the CIA provide the Committee ^{both the} above-described contact report & all vol. of materials concerning the Minsk Radio Plant. (admitting the HSCA) The CIA provided a review of the docs. in the volume in the M.R.P. indicated that no such file existed regarding the M.R.P., but no contact report existed in that file. (DCC). The file review did indicate that in 1975, Daniel Selous had made a similar request ^{in regard to} ~~and as info offered to him for Deasely~~ for Deasely. It was informed by the CIA that no such report was received.

If the 29 persons requested, our place did not have a file for me under ^{the Ag. was not able to locate} ~~in the case~~ of 6 other indivs., the file review did not indicate that they were not.

22

to the U.S.

The HSCA reviewed

The HSCA After prep. files on ²⁹ indivs. who fit the above-described criteria, the CIA provided files on ²⁰ of the 29 indivs. on whom they maintained records. ^{Both} 20 files were reviewed as ^{well as any existing} DDC files ^{for} regarding those indivs. In the case of 6 indivs., there is no indication in their files that they were returned to the U.S. Even so, there were occasional reports from sources who observed or spoke w/ these persons while in the S.U., but there is no indication of direct contact w/ them by the CIA.

In regard to the other 23 defectors, ^{the file review indicates that} there is no record of direct CIA contact w/ 18 of them. Again, some of these files contain a report from a source who reported

19 4

(4)

It becomes clear from the review of files on these defs. that debriefing of defectors was in fact somewhat of a random occurrence. However, in the instances ~~where~~^{in which} the Ag. did choose to debrief returning Am. def., the Ag appears to be interested in ~~various~~^{the} topics of general interest ~~regarding~~^{regarding} life in certain areas.

of the Sov. U. In this regard, 90 — Where are you.

The persons who were debriefed were similar to the fact that they left & ret. w/i the same general time period, and spent their time in the S. U. in areas of interest to the CIA.

More ext. deb. were conducted of the other 2 defs. E.g. W., a plastics expert w/r. A.C. whose def. to the S. U. in 1959 was highly publicized, ret. to the U.S. in 6/63.

W had been employed in the S. U. at the Sov. Scientific Inst. of Polytech. Plastics.

Shortly after his return, He was debriefed in his home territory by ~~Ag.~~^{Ag.} from DO/C, SR/6 & the R.F. It was decided that a more ext. debriefing was in order in W's subj. brought to the Washington where he was deb. for a period of 2 wks.

The deb. reports incl. a chron. of W's life & the CIA's access of him as well as a log. of info. regarding life in the S. U., W's work there & being info. on persons he had met during his residence there.

Likewise, Vito Cimarelli who had lived in the S. U. for nearly 4 yrs., was selected for purposes of debriefing shortly after his ret. to the U.S. in late June of 1963. His initial debriefing included such subjs. as his motivation to defect to USSR as well as activities engaged in during Moscow stay, relocation from Moscow to Kiev & general aspects of life such as residence costs & costs. While the Ag. felt that they would be interested in eliciting more info. ^{on such topics} re: life in the S. U. as cost of living, med. care, consumer goods, highway/highways, transport, restrictions w/r. Kiev.

While the CIA felt it was unfeasible to debrief R. more thoroughly due to the current status of trying to regain U.S. cit.,

Ag. felt

1622-1125-B : Index cards

#1623-1125-C Dated 30 Oct. 1975

Discusses letters intercepted

States that copies of intercepted letters were passed to FBI in course of normal exchange of intelligence. Substance doesn't relate to JFL access.

"The records examined to date do not disclose whether or not this information was made avail. to the N.C. by the FBI or CIA."

Vol. 5 608-256-C

Copies of letters ^{written by LHO to requester} forwarded to CIA by letter dated 17 March 1964
from J. Lee Rankin, H.C. of N.C. & R. Helms, ADP

Ratio - questions

Gen. Backgd.

Attn. file on 1 HQ item

Index cards

HSCA question

Agency response

#1

I CIA statements to H.C. (#988-927-BD, #1038-405-B, CIA info. provided W.C. Insert for CT Staff History
#1063-964-B, #1073-964-L)

II CIA statements to ~~Senate~~ (#961, 962, 969, 970)

CIA statements to HSCA; D/C:

III T.B.C. memo & interviews (#435-173-A)
[#3369]

IV Defectors

M.K. (#1004-400)
S.O.P. - DCO

V G.R.B. request

#609
#610

VI ~~Scope of AIA~~ See #1188-1000 p.3

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#618-673

609-786

610-263

1188-1000

1004-400

1187-

Hock - Rock. Comm.